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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, possession of child pornography has been recognized as one of the most serious federal crimes.1 In an effort to close
the thriving Internet market for obscene depictions of children, Congress
has proscribed a base-level sentencing range of twenty-seven to thirtythree months in federal prison for defendants convicted of child pornography offenses.2 This sentencing range can increase drastically based
on a multitude of often-applicable sentencing enhancements.3
Similarly, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) has
made child pornography related crimes among the most harshly punishable federal offenses.4 Nevertheless, sentencing judges have regained the
right to depart from the recommended Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines), and have done so with increasing frequency for these offenses.5 Child pornography sentences have thus functioned as the equivalent of a lightning strike; the congressionally mandated harsh sentences
† Candidate for J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Political Science and English,
University of Washington, 2007. The author would like to thank the members of The Seattle University Law Review, especially Pete Talevich, Gabriella Wagner, James Beebe, Micol Sirkin, Kurt
Kruckeberg, and Colin Prince for their hard work and helpful insight on this article. Most importantly, the author would like to thank her parents, Mike and Deb Rigsby, for their unending love and
support.
1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, tbls. 13 & 17 (2008).
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008). The twenty-seven to thirty-three
month sentence above is the proscribed Guideline range for an offender with no criminal history and
no offender enhancements.
3. For example, the use of a computer, the age of the child victim depicted, and the number of
images or videos can all greatly enhance this base-level range. Id. A person with no criminal history, who uses the Internet to download a two-minute video depicting pornographic images of a tenyear-old child through a file-sharing network, would have a Guideline range of 87–108 months in
prison. Id. (basing this number off of a nine-point sentencing enhancement for the base-level offense).
4. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13.
5. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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strike some defendants but miss many others. The cases discussed below
illustrate the disparate results that characterize federal sentencings for
child pornography offenses.
In July 2006, an investigation in Europe uncovered an Internet bulletin board called “Funny World,” which was designed to facilitate the
exchange of child pornography.6 The board was shut down soon after,
but not before, law enforcement agents recovered numerous screen captures of Internet provider (IP) addresses belonging to users of the database.7 One of these IP addresses was traced back to Ralph Rausch, a forty-nine-year-old divorced ex-Air Force Sergeant with three children, who
lived in Colorado.8
Upon searching Rausch’s home, federal agents uncovered several
thousand images and videos depicting what was described as explicit,
“hard-core” child pornography.9 Further inquiry into “Funny World”
revealed that Rausch had made over one hundred postings to the group in
the span of less than three months.10 The postings varied from those
sharing photos of young children in sexually explicit positions to comments about Rausch’s own sexual excitement while viewing the images
to other users’ requests for child pornography material.11 Rausch admitted that looking at child pornography had been a “hobby” for him since
2000 and that he had visited several other Internet bulletin boards where
he would trade and share up to 100 child pornography images a night
with other users.12
Rausch pled guilty in federal district court to one count of possession of child pornography.13 His advisory Guideline range was 97–120
months in federal prison.14 He was sentenced to one day in prison, with
credit for time served, and supervised release.15 The sentencing judge in
Rausch found the defendant’s poor physical health to be the biggest mitigating factor justifying his exceptionally low sentence.16
Less than two months after the Rausch decision, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals had occasion to review a similar case.17 The defendant,
Orville Toothman, had pled guilty to one count of possession of child
6. United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1298 (D. Colo. 2008).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1298–99.
9. Id. at 1299.
10. Id. at 1298.
11. Id. at 1299.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1296.
14. Id. at 1306.
15. Id. at 1307.
16. See id. at 1308.
17. United States v. Toothman, 543 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2008).
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pornography18 and had the same advisory sentencing range as Rausch:
97–121 months.19 Toothman sought the mandatory minimum sentence
of sixty months due in large part to his poor health.20 He was completely
blind in one eye, legally blind in the other, and suffered from hypertension, high blood pressure, diabetes, and low blood sugar. Additionally,
Toothman was at high risk of needing an emergency retina-repair surgery
that could not be performed in a timely manner if he were incarcerated.21
Toothman’s treating ophthalmologist testified at his sentencing hearing
that Toothman would be completely blind in both eyes in three years and
would be unable to defend himself in a prison setting.22 The Court of
Appeals upheld the district court judge’s sentence of ninety-seven
months in prison.23
These widely disparate sentences for very similar crimes are an unfortunate, and alarmingly frequent, side effect of judicial uncertainty in
imposing sentences. Recent years have seen a marked increase in federal
prosecutions for the crimes of distribution, production, and possession of
child pornography,24 and as a result of the Guidelines being only advisory,25 judges are afforded a great deal of discretion in imposing sentences. This broad discretion has led to widely disparate sentences for
similarly situated defendants such as Rausch and Toothman, who served
one day and ninety-seven months, respectively, for the same offense.
This outcome is contrary to the very purpose for which the Guidelines
were imposed in the first place—to achieve fairness and proportionality
among defendants convicted of similar crimes.26 Judges exercise their
discretion in imposing below-Guideline sentences for the crime of child
pornography to circumvent the Guidelines completely and substitute
their personal opinion for that of Congress and the Sentencing Commission.
The Guideline range for child pornography reflects sound and clear
congressional intent to impose harsh penalties on defendants to deter,
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2009).
19. Toothman, 543 F.2d at 968.
20. Id. at 969.
21. Id. at 969–70.
22. Id. at 969.
23. Id. at 971.
24. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, CRIMINAL CASES FILED BY MAJOR OFFENSE (EXCLUDING
TRANSFERS), tbl.5.34, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2007/Table503.pdf.
(showing that for the crime of sexually explicit material, there were 85 cases in 1995 as compared to
1,544 in 2007).
25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL
SENTENCING
(March
15,
2006),http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
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and ultimately eliminate, the market for child pornography. For this reason, this Comment argues that sentences that fall outside the Guidelines
range should be reviewed with much greater scrutiny and should not be
used solely to reflect a judge’s view that the advised sentence is too
harsh for the crime it serves to punish. Specifically, below-Guideline
sentences are being imposed with greater frequency because judges fail
to consider all appropriate factors—namely, the nature of the offense, the
purpose of punishment, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants convicted of similar crimes.
Part II of this Comment examines the history of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, starting with their creation and then the jurisprudence
that led to the Guidelines being advisory only. It also tracks the simultaneous legislative and Department of Justice (DOJ) measures that were
implemented to impose harsher penalties for child pornography. Part III
discusses the current state of sentencing for child pornography by looking at trends over the past decade in a number of prosecutions, the class
of defendant that is being prosecuted, and the types of sentences being
imposed. It also looks at recent cases in different circuits and examines
how judges have been exercising their broad discretion in imposing sentences. Part IV considers arguments that the Guideline levels for child
pornography offenses are too high, and posits that these arguments are
unpersuasive because child pornography offenses should not be viewed
merely as propensity crimes, but as the deliberate and repeated victimization of a child. Additionally, it considers the class of defendants charged
with child pornography offenses and argues that such offenses pose a
particular challenge to judges because they are demographically atypical.
Part V proposes how judges should consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors in regard to these crimes so that greater predictability
in sentencing is once again achieved.
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
The current sentencing structure affords federal district judges significant discretion in imposing sentences for all federal offenses.27 Although Congress has frequently attempted to limit the sentencing discretion of judges through legislative enactment, successful constitutional
challenges to mandatory sentencing have restored the historical role of
judges in choosing from a wide range of sentencing options.28

27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 at 3 (2008).
28. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220; United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Spears v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009).
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This Part briefly summarizes the legal and historical background
that has given rise to the current system of federal sentencing. First, it
discusses the USSC’s creation of the Guidelines. Second, it considers
the congressional limit placed on judicial discretion through the
PROTECT Act. Third, it discusses the landmark Supreme Court decision of United States v. Booker, which rendered the Guidelines advisory
only. Finally, it analyzes the string of post-Booker Supreme Court decisions that further define the role of the advisory Guidelines and the ways
in which reviewing courts must consider a sentence that deviates from
the Guidelines.
A. The Shift from Judicial Discretion to Mandatory Guidelines
Prior to 1984, the U.S. had a long history of indeterminate sentencing in federal criminal matters.29 Although Congress prescribed statutory
maximum penalties, a great deal of judicial discretion was afforded to the
sentencing judge.30 This broad discretion had the adverse effect of creating unpredictable sentencing disparities among defendants convicted of
similar crimes.31 To achieve fairer and more consistent sentences, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),32 which established a statutory framework for federal sentencing.33
Among other things, the SRA created the USSC, an independent
commission of the Judicial Branch in charge of creating sentencing
guidelines that would be mandatory for all courts.34 The Guidelines
yielded a sentencing range, and the sentencing judge, taking into account
both the offense and the defendant’s criminal history, would then be required to sentence within this range.35 The SRA compelled sentencing
judges to impose sentences consistent with the policy considerations
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).36 Overall, judges are instructed to

29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 at 2 (2008).
30. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FED. SENT’G GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1 (2006). See also Douglas
A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2005).
31. Berman, supra note 30, at 3.
32. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3626 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 28
U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000).
33. FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra
note 26.
34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION (June 2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf.
35. Id. Although the SRA returned greater determinacy to sentencing, judges still reserved
some discretion under the mandatory Guideline system. In special circumstances and upon motion
of either the government or defense, a judge could impose an exceptional upward or downward
sentence for cases where the Guideline range was not appropriate. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–2.0 (2007).
36. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
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“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve
the goals of punishment.37 Consistent with § 3553(a), a judge must consider the following: (1) the nature and circumstance of the offense and
the characteristics of the offender;38 (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the aims of a sentence that are providing a just punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation;39 (3) the
kinds of sentences available;40 (4) the Sentencing Guidelines;41 (5) the
Sentencing Commission policy statements;42 (6) the need to avoid disparities in sentencing;43 and (7) the need to provide restitution.44
The Guidelines became binding; however, judges were given some
discretion to impose exceptional upward or downward departures from
the Guideline range in response to sufficient aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.45 The goal of the Guidelines was to provide a system to
ensure that “criminals with similar backgrounds who commit similar
crimes received similar sentences, irrespective of race, socioeconomic
status, or geographic locations.”46
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided, in Koon v. United States, that
on appeal, sentences that departed from the Guidelines would be reviewed for abuse of discretion.47 The Court’s decision in Koon afforded
greater discretion to the district court judge than previously recognized
under the Guidelines.48 The Court stated that deferential review was appropriate because it would afford “the district court the necessary flexibility to resolve questions involving multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.”49 Koon was the first of several cases in which the Supreme Court restored sentencing discretion to
district judges in the face of a congressional act limiting such discretion.50
37. Id. § 3553(a).
38. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
39. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
40. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
41. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
42. Id. § 3553(a)(5).
43. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
44. Id. § 3553(a)(7).
45. United States v. Minstretta, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–2.0 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (setting out the standard for a judge to deviate from the Guidelines).
46. FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra
note 26.
47. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)).
50. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 151, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
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B. The PROTECT Act
The surge in permissible discretion realized in Koon was shortlived; several years later, Congress again took measures to limit judicial
discretion in sentencing. In 2003, Congress unanimously passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act.51 The PROTECT Act aimed to strengthen the
government’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes committed against children, specifically child pornography and abduction
crimes.52 The two major catalysts for the PROTECT Act were (1) congressional concern that the high percentage of downward departures in
sentences was too great to deter crimes, particularly sex offenses involving children; and (2) congressional desire to impose harsher penalties for
sex offenses against children.53
The Act, as passed, also contained an amendment sponsored by
Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, which enacted several reforms to
ensure that the Guidelines would be applied more stringently.54 Ultimately, the Feeney Amendment sought a return to the original ideals
Congress was seeking to bring to federal sentencing with the SRA—
consistency and predictability.55 Specifically, the PROTECT Act, along
with the Feeney Amendment, included numerous reforms aimed toward
reducing the number of downward departures from the Guidelines.56
After enactment of the PROTECT Act, judges who imposed a downward
sentence were now required to submit detailed reports setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law for their decision.57
Additionally and perhaps most notably, the Act changed the standard of appellate review to de novo.58 This gave appellate courts the
power to overturn any departure that they believed did not comport to the
objectives set out in § 3553(a), which severely limited district court

51. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT (Apr. 30, 2003).
52. Id.
53. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REP. ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FED.
SENT’G 115 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/booker_report.pdf.
54. The Feeney Amendment was enacted as Title IV of the PROTECT Act of 2003.
PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 3553, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003).
55. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to all Fed. Prosecutors, Office of the
Attorney Gen., Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and
Sentencing Appeals (Jul. 28, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag072803.pdf.
56. Id.
57. New Chair Talks About U.S. Sentencing Commission Post-Blakely, NEWSL. FED. CTS. (The
Third
Branch,
Washington
D.C.)
Oct.
2004,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct04ttb/interview.
58. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(1)–(2), 117 Stat. at 670.
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judges’ discretion.59 The PROTECT Act, therefore, marked a return to
Congress’s intent when it adopted the SRA; the Guidelines should be
mandatory and generally enforced, and judicial discretion should be limited to cases that presented extreme mitigating or aggravating circumstances.60
C. United States v. Booker and an Advisory Guideline System
The limits placed on judicial discretion by the PROTECT Act came
to a screeching halt in 2005 when the Supreme Court held that the mandatory Guidelines were constitutionally impermissible.61 The Court held
that an enhanced sentence under the Guidelines based on a judge’s assessment of an aggravating fact violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.62 The Court, in a 5–4 decision authored by
Justice Scalia, remedied this constitutional violation by excising the provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory.63 Therefore, the
Guidelines became advisory only.64 Although, post-Booker, the Guidelines are only advisory, they are still one of the statutory considerations
judges must evaluate when imposing a sentence.65
The Booker decision effectively restored the vast judicial discretion
that had been limited by Congress through both the SRA and the
PROTECT Act. The majority in Booker stated that the new advisory
Guidelines were consistent with congressional intent;66 however, the dissent expressed serious doubt about this contention.67 The dissent pointed
to the Senate report following the floor debate on the SRA where Congress had explicitly refused an advisory system as evidence that the ma-

59. Lawrence Goldman, The Feeney Amendment, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 4, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/search (search for Feeney Amendment; then follow the Feeney
Amendment hyperlink).
60. Id.
61. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Blakely decision held that a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court sentenced a defendant to a sentence above the statutory maximum of the standard range for his offense based on the sentencing
judge’s independent finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.” Id. The facts supporting the aggravating circumstances were not found by a jury, but rather solely decided by the
sentencing judge. Id.
62. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). The Booker majority was a somewhat atypical combination of Justices—Justices Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
The dissenting Justices were O’Connor, Breyer, Rehnquist, and Kennedy.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (e) (2009).
64. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
65. Id. at 259–60.
66. Id. at 249–58.
67. Id. at 299.
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jority’s holding was not consistent with congressional intent.68 The dissent also pointed out that Congress again reiterated its desire to limit
judicial discretion and impose mandatory Guidelines by passing the
PROTECT Act.69
Additionally, Booker changed the appellate review standard for departures from Guideline sentences from de novo to a reasonableness review.70 In so doing, the Booker decision restored trial court judges with
their traditional discretion and went further to ensure that it was less likely that they would be overturned on appeal. Still unclear, however, was
how higher courts would review departure sentences post-Booker.
D. Presumption of Reasonableness: Rita and Gall
This question was soon addressed when, in 2007, the Supreme
Court had occasion to determine the proper presumption to apply to both
within- and below-Guideline sentences on appeal.71 In Rita, a case in
which the defendant was sentenced within the Guideline range for perjury, obstruction of justice, and false statements, the Court was presented
with the issue of whether an appellate court could presume that a withinGuideline sentence was reasonable.72 The majority found that a circuit
court could legally apply a presumption of reasonableness to a withinGuideline sentence.73 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, went on to
explain that when the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission
agree on the proper sentence to impose on a defendant, this “double de-

68. Id. at 295–96. See 133 CONG. REC. 33109 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“The core
function of the guidelines and the underlying statute . . . is to reduce disparity in sentencing and
restore fairness and predictability to the sentencing process. Adherence to the guidelines is therefore
properly required under the law except in . . . rare and particularly unusual instances . . . .”) Id. at
33110 (remarks of Sen. Biden) (“That notion of allowing the courts to, in effect, second-guess the
wisdom of any sentencing guideline is plainly contrary to the act’s purpose of having a sentencing
guidelines system that is mandatory, except when the court finds a circumstance meeting the standard articulated in § 3553(b). It is also contrary to the purpose of having Congress, rather than the
courts, review the sentencing guidelines for the appropriateness of authorized levels of punishment.”).
69. Booker, 543 U.S. at 299. See 149 CONG. REC. 9345, 9353, 9354 (2003) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch) (arguing that the PROTECT Act “says the game is over for judges: You will have some
departure guidelines from the Sentencing Commission, but you are not going to go beyond those,
and you are not going to go on doing what is happening in our society today on children’s crimes, no
matter how softhearted you are. That is what we are trying to do here . . . . We say in his bill: We
are sick of this, judges. You are not going to do this anymore except within the guidelines set by the
Sentencing Commission”). Id. at 9354 (“Trial judges systematically undermine the sentencing
guidelines by creating new reasons to reduce these sentences.”).
70. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260.
71. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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termination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a
reasonable one.”74
Later that year, the Supreme Court considered whether it was proper to apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences falling outside of the Guideline range.75 The case that served as the vehicle to resolve this question centered on Brian Gall’s conviction for conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance.76 The government argued for the minimum Guideline range of thirty months; however, due to the mitigating
circumstances of the case,77 the sentencing judge chose to depart from
the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of only thirty-six months probation.78 The Court held that post-Booker, federal courts have the power to
impose any reasonable sentence so long as they explain their reasoning.79
Therefore, although under Rita a presumption of reasonableness may be
applied to review a within-Guideline sentence, appellate courts may not
apply a presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence that departs from
the Guidelines.80
The effects of Rita and Gall are twofold: Rita reinforces the sound
legislative intent of imposing the Guidelines by affording deference to a
trial judge’s decision to impose a within-Guideline sentence, while Gall
appears to strengthen judicial discretion by making it less likely for a
trial judge to be overturned on appeal when departing from the Guidelines.81 The result of this judicial discretion has led to unpredictable and
disparate outcomes in sentences imposed on defendants. In recent years,
the negative effects of this trend have been dramatically played out in
federal sentencings for child pornography crimes. While Rita and Gall
represented substantial changes in federal sentencing, they were not the
last in this long line of cases. The Kimbrough case discussed below was
a monumental ruling that forever changed federal sentencings.

74. Id. at 350. (“The courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstances that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of section 3553(a)
in the mine run of cases, it is probably that the sentence is reasonable.”).
75. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Gall had been involved in a drug ring that was distributing ecstasy while he was in college.
Id. at 41–42. He voluntarily withdrew from the drug conspiracy and moved across the country
where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. Id. He voluntarily turned himself in
when federal agents later tracked him down. Id.
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. at 46.
80. Id. at 47.
81. Id.

2010]

A Call for Judicial Scrutiny

1329

E. 100-to-1 Ratio in Sentencing: Kimbrough and Spears
While the Supreme Court, in Booker and later in Rita and Gall,
demonstrated an inclination toward providing judges with greater discretion in imposing sentences, its decision two years later in United States v.
Kimbrough took a big step toward complete elimination of some Guidelines.82
In Kimbrough, the Court allowed mere disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s prescribed range to serve as a basis to impose a
below-Guideline sentence.83 Following the defendant’s guilty plea, the
trial judge had imposed a sentence of fifteen years in prison and five
years of supervised release; the Guideline range was nineteen to twentytwo-and-a-half years.84 The primary reason for this sentence was the
trial judge’s finding that the Guideline range for that offense—which
equated 100 grams of powder cocaine with 1 gram of crack cocaine—
was per se unreasonable.85 According to the Court, this exercise of judicial discretion was permissible.86
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court.87 It held that
since the trial court judge had appropriately considered the § 3553(a)
factors when imposing a sentence, the sentence was reasonable, even
though it did not fall within the Sentencing Commission’s prescribed
range.88 Most notably, Kimbrough seems to support the position that
judges can categorically reject a Guideline range if they find it yields too
high of a sentence.89
Just a year later, the Court strongly reinforced its holding in Kimbrough when it issued a per curiam opinion granting summary reversal in
Spears v. United States.90 After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that a trial court “may not categorically reject the ratio set forth by
the Guidelines”91 and had “impermissibly varied [from the Guidelines]
by replacing the 100:1 quantity ratio inherent in the advisory Guideline

82. United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 92.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 111–12.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 110. The Court stated that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court
to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence
‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” Id. (emphasis
added).
90. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009).
91. United States v. Spears (Spears II), 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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range with a 20:1 quantity ratio,”92 the Supreme Court took the unusual
step of granting summary reversal (without accepting briefing or oral
argument) and reinstating the trial court’s sentence.93 The Spears court
firmly reinforced the discretion given to judges in Kimbrough when it
stated “we now clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary
categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”94
Though Kimbrough and Spears stand for the proposition that a trial
court can categorically reject a Guideline range for a “run of the mill”
case,95 these holdings only address the 100:1 sentencing ratio of crack
versus powder cocaine.96 However, the precedent set by this line of cases would allow a judge to reject the Guidelines completely for a possession of child pornography case in the absence of any particular findings
of mitigating circumstances. In short, the current jurisprudence conveys
to trial judges an inordinate amount of discretion in sentencing. Given
that the child pornography Guidelines reflect sound and supported Congressional determinations, judges should not abuse the discretion afforded to them through Booker and Kimbrough to circumvent the Guidelines because this would lead to even greater disparity and unpredictability in sentencing.
III. TRENDS IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTIONS: STATISTICAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT CASE LAW
The increased judicial discretion that has resulted from Booker, Rita, and Kimbrough cases has had an extreme effect on federal prosecutions of child pornography offenses. This Part examines the current statistical data for this crime and analyzes the ways in which child pornography prosecutions have posed a unique problem for sentencing judges.
This Part begins by analyzing the current statistics involving the
number of prosecutions and average length of sentences for child pornography offenses. It then discusses statistics regarding the demographics
of child pornography defendants as compared to the average federal defendant. It ends by discussing how the atypically high sentence length
and number of prosecutions, as well as the atypical demographic makeup of defendants, sets child pornography offenses far apart from the typical federal crime.
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Spears (Spears I), 469 F.3d 1166, 1178 (8th Cir. 2006) (en
banc)).
93. Spears II, 533 F.3d at 717.
94. Id.
95. United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
96. Id.
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A. Number of Prosecutions and Length of Sentences
The number of federal prosecutions for child pornography has drastically increased since Congress passed the PROTECT Act in 1996.97 In
1995, only eighty-five criminal cases were filed in federal court for sexually explicit material.98 By 2000, this number had increased by more
than 500%.99 The number of cases has continued to grow—reaching
1,544 in 2007,100 which makes federal prosecutions for sexually explicit
material by far the fastest-growing offense being filed in federal
courts.101
Additionally, the median length of sentences imposed has drastically increased in recent years.102 The USSC releases annual reports tracking statistics of federal prosecutions based on circuit and primary offense
type.103 The average sentence length for the primary offense category104—which includes production, possession, and distribution of child
pornography—has increased from 29.1 months in 1996105 to 119 months
in 2008.106 The only primary offense categories with a higher average
sentence length are murder and kidnapping or hostage taking.107 It is
clear that the past decade has seen a rapid and remarkable increase in not
only the number of federal prosecutions for child pornography, but also
the severity of the crime (reflected by the comparatively harsh sentences
being imposed on offenders).
A cursory glance at these statistics may suggest that increased judicial discretion post-Booker has not had an adverse affect on the imposition of appropriate penalties on child pornography defendants. However,
a closer review shows a vast disparity among the sentences being im97. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 151, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
98. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, supra note 24.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13. See also USSC reports for 1996–2008.
103. Id.
104. The USSC publishes annual statistics on federal prosecutions and sentences. For simplicity, many of the statistics are divided into “primary offense categories,” which are determined by the
judgment of conviction order. The primary offense category groups similar crimes into categories to
make the Sentencing Commission reports more manageable. The crimes analyzed in this Comment
fall into the pornography/prostitution category, which includes: dealing in obscene matter, transportation of minor for prostitution/sex, transportation for prostitution/sex (adult), sexual exploitation of
minors, materials involving sexual exploitation of minors, obscene telephone or broadcasting, and
selling or buying children for pornography. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY
QUARTERLY REPORT (2008) app. A at 1, 7.
105. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET (2007), at tbl.13.
106. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13.
107. Id.
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posed, which demonstrates a lack of consensus among federal judges
about how to sentence these defendants. Sentencing Commission reports
for 2008 indicate that 55.2% of the cases in the child pornography primary offense category were within Guideline range.108 About 3.1% of cases
were upward departures from the Guideline range and 33.1% were
downward departures.109 Only 8.7% of the cases were government recommended downward departures as a result of plea bargains or prosecutorial discretion.110 These numbers reflect a vast disparity with the overall averages for all federal prosecutions. The overall average for within
Guideline range sentences across all crimes in 2008 was 59.7%.111
Overall, upward departures occurred in only 1.6% of cases and downward departures only accounted for 13.1%; both of these numbers are
less than half of the amount for child pornography cases.112 Furthermore,
the overall average for government recommended downward departures
was 25.5%.113
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55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Child
Pornography
Offenses
Overall
Average for
Federal
Offenses
Within
Guideline

Upward
Departure

Downward
Departure

Government
Recommended

These numbers indicate two alarming trends for child pornography
prosecutions. First, there is a far greater disparity in the sentences imposed in the child pornography primary offense category than the overall
average of federal prosecutions. Not only are there fewer withinGuideline sentences, but there are drastically more upward and downward departures from the Guidelines than the overall average for federal
prosecutions. Second, this disparity is attributable to judicial discretion,
not prosecutorial discretion, because far less of these cases are government-sponsored departures than the overall average.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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B. Demograaphic Profile of Child Pornnography Deffendants
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Additionally,
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sonable.122 So long as a sentencing judge uses the factors set out in
§ 3553(a) to explain a downward departure, and does not consider factors
extrinsic to those in the statute, most below-Guideline sentences will be
affirmed on appeal. This has caused federal sentences to return to a state
similar to how it was prior to the SRA—unpredictable and, ultimately,
unfair.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GUIDELINE RANGE: PROPENSITY CRIME
OR CREATING A MARKET FOR CHILD VICTIMIZATION?
Despite increased below-Guideline sentences for child pornography
defendants, this crime remains amongst those with the harshest sentences
attached to it.123 Many critics oppose the child pornography Guidelines
as being too strict or unnecessarily harsh.124 There are two main arguments against the child pornography Guidelines: (1) that they are not representative of empirical data and congressional intent and, therefore,
should not be presumed reasonable;125 and (2) that child pornography is
not a propensity crime—child pornography defendants do not have an
increased likelihood to engage in sexually explicit conduct with children.126
These two arguments are unsound and unpersuasive. First, the
Guidelines are supported by years of congressional and DOJ measures to
impose harsher penalties on child pornography offenders due in large
part to public concern.127 Imposing appropriate punishments is a job
properly left to the legislature, and in the case of child pornography
Guidelines, sentences reflect public sentiment and support for imposing
harsher penalties.128 Second, child pornography sentencing laws are not
simply meant to deter or incapacitate to prevent future wrongful acts
against children;129 possessing, producing, and distributing child pornography are wrongful in and of themselves because they continually vic-

122. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
123. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at table 23.
124. See Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed
Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines (Jul. 3, 2008) (federal defender paper), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf. See generally United States v.
Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744
(S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009-1011 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
125. Id.
126. See Laura M. Klever, Reinvigorated Judicial Discretion After Booker: Burden or Boon to
Sexual Exploitation Offenders?, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 93, 108 (2007).
127. See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847
(2008).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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timize the child.130 Harsh penalties are necessary not because child pornography is a propensity crime, but because harsh sentences will help
eliminate the market for child pornography altogether and bring an end
to the continual victimization of innocent children.131
This Part begins by discussing the legislative intent arguments
against the current Guidelines for child pornography offenses. It then
argues that the child pornography Guideline range is consistent with
congressional and DOJ intent and proportionate in relation to other offenses. It ends by discussing the criticism that child pornography offenses are merely propensity crimes and by arguing that, in fact, these
crimes are themselves completed and harmful offenses.
A. Legislative Intent
Critics of the current child pornography Guidelines argue that the
advisory sentencing ranges are too harsh and do not reflect sound congressional intent and empirical research.132 While it is true that Congress
continues to modify the Guidelines—including raising the statutory minimum sentence for some offenses133—these modifications both reflect
congressional intent and response to public concern.134 This section begins by discussing the numerous legislative and DOJ measures taken to
further criminalize child pornography related offenses and ends by considering the Guideline range for child pornography against the use of
Guidelines in the context of other crimes. Taken together, these considerations overcome arguments that the Guidelines are unduly harsh.
Thus, the Guidelines reflect sound policy choices made by Congress to
impose harsh, deterrent penalties for this offense.
1. Congressional and DOJ Actions
In November of 1990, Congress criminalized possession of child
pornography.135 Prior to 1990, the act of merely possessing a sexually
explicit image involving a minor was not viewed as a federal crime;
however, congressional intent and public sentiment shifted, in part with

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Stabenow, supra note 124.
133. Id.
134. Press Release, Sen. Bill Frist, Frist, Walsh Hail Passage of Child Predators Legislation
(July 21, 2006). See also Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2006)
(stating that after the third showing of To Catch a Predator aired, Dateline received over 15,000
emails from parents, teachers, and law enforcement agents lending their support for the show).
135. Pub. L. 101-647 tit. III, § 323(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4818, 4819 (1990). See also Stabenow,
supra note 124 at 4.
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the rise of the Internet, to view possession as a punishable offense.136
Over the next several years, many other legislative acts would serve to
further criminalize and monitor the child pornography market.137
Legislative concerns about downward departures in sentencing for
defendants engaged in viewing sexually explicit materials depicting minors spawned the PROTECT Act of 2003.138 The heavily supported139
PROTECT Act represents a relatively recent and landmark legislative
acknowledgement that child pornography crimes require harsh sentences
for a deterrence purpose.140 Similarly, government recognition of the
increasing severity of the problem of child pornography spurred the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to launch Operation Predator, an initiative designed
to protect children worldwide by enacting measures to help law enforcement arrest foreign pedophiles, human traffickers, and pornographers.141
In 2006, the DOJ launched Project Safe Childhood (PSC) to fight
the proliferation of Internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children.142
PSC works in partnership with state and local law enforcement, the FBI,
ICE, the U.S. Marshals Service, and various advocacy organizations to
identify child victims and apprehend Internet predators.143 PSC has been
successful in increasing the number of indictments filed against offenders and raising public awareness of the dangers of Internet crimes.144
Later that year, President Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which aimed at strengthening federal law
to protect children from sexual crimes, to prevent child pornography, and
to make the Internet safer for children.145 The Adam Walsh Act is criticized in part for being a sensationalized response to child pornography
and the victimization of children through the Internet.146 Particularly,
critics note that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, motivated by his out136. Stabenow, supra note 124.
137. Id.
138. FINAL REP. ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FED. SENT’G, supra note 53.
139. FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT, supra note 51.
140. Id.
141. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Operation Predator (July 9,
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0210.shtm.
142. Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (Nov. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.projectsafechildhood.gov/video/PSC_Announcement_FactSheet.pdf.
143. Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (Sept. 23,2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-opa-845.html.
144. Id.
145. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child Protection
and
Safety
Act
of
2006,
H.R.
4472
(July
27,
2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html.
146. See Dara L. Schottenfeld, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex Offenders, Oh My:
Why it is Time to Call Off the Hunt, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (2000); Stabenow, supra note 124.
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rage over the Dateline series, To Catch a Predator, pushed hard for the
Act.147 To Catch a Predator began airing in 2004 and featured a series
of undercover investigations of child sex predators that used the Internet
to communicate with minors.148 The show tracked defendants as they
engaged in sexually explicit conduct with decoy minors and then agreed
to meet them at the children’s homes.149 Many critics of the child pornography Guidelines argue that the so-called “To Catch a Predator effect”
has sensationalized the crime of child pornography and has been a catalyst for disproportionate sentences.150 One commentator went so far as to
analogize the treatment of Internet sex offenders to the Salem witch trials
and the McCarthy era.151 However, in reality, the show has served to
boost public knowledge of the dangerousness and ease of Internet crimes
and the vast market that exists for child pornography.152 Public outrage,
generated in part by the show, has prompted thousands of letters and
emails nationwide calling for harsher penalties and legislative action.153
Effectually, the show’s popularity demonstrates that the Guidelines reflect the evolving standards of decency of the American public, and thus,
indicates that the Guideline range for child pornography related offenses
reflect clear and sound legislative intent.
The above discussion illustrates a long history of legislative and
DOJ efforts to impose harsher penalties on child pornography related
offenses. These efforts were, in large part, a response to public concern.
Furthermore, the number of prosecutions and the length of sentences
have increased proportionately with an increase in legislative awareness
of the problem. Thus, the argument that the child pornography Guidelines do not represent congressional intent is both weak and false.
2. Child Pornography Guidelines in Relation to Other Offenses
Finally, perhaps the most compelling argument against the Guideline range for child pornography offenses is that these defendants receive
an even longer mean sentence than defendants convicted of sexual assault.154 Critics argue that the Guidelines cannot be reasonable and cannot reflect sound congressional intent if they yield a higher sentence for a

147. Press Release, Sen. Bill Frist, Frist, Walsh Hail Passage of Child Predators Legislation
(July, 21, 2006).
148. Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast May 24, 2005).
149. Id.
150. Klever, supra note 126; Stabenow, supra note 124; Schottenfeld, supra note 146.
151. Schottenfeld, supra note 146.
152. See generally Frist, supra note 147.
153. Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2006).
154. Stabenow, supra note 124.
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person who merely looks at a pornographic image of a child versus a
person who actually rapes or molests a child.155
This argument is flawed because it misappropriates the cause of
lower sentences for defendants convicted of sexual assault to the Guidelines, when actually it is the result of prosecutorial or judicial discretion.156 While the base Guideline range for a first time offender convicted of child pornography is eighteen months,157 the base Guideline
range for a first time offender convicted of sexually assaulting a minor is
nearly double this.158 Clearly, the Guidelines proscribe a much higher
sentence for sexual assault than possession of pornography.
There are many explanations for the incongruent results that appear
in the mean length of sentences for child pornography versus sexual assault of a child. Most compelling is the argument that a sexual assault
trial is more arduous, emotional, and difficult to prevail at than a child
pornography trial.159 Almost without fail, a sexual assault case requires
the child victim to testify in court if the case proceeds to trial.160 It is
emotionally scarring for a young child who has already been victimized
to then have to go through the traumatizing experience of testifying in
court with his or her assailant sitting right there.161
In addition to the impact the trial process has on the child victim,
there are often much more difficult proof issues with sexual assault cases
than with child pornography cases.162 For child pornography, the proof
of the crime is the image itself, and often the only thing a prosecutor
must show is a chain of custody between the defendant and his or her
computer.163 Sexual assault cases are much more difficult to prove because much of the jury’s decision comes down to the weight of the victim’s testimony.164
For these reasons, it is likely that many more sexual assault defendants receive favorable plea bargains whereas child pornography defendants are pleading as charged.165 Favorable plea bargains may include
the prosecutor foregoing adding certain sentencing enhancements that
155. Id.
156. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Eva J. Klain et al., Child Pornography: The Criminal-Justice-System-Response, Nat’l Ctr.
For
Missing
&
Exploited
Children
at
10
(Mar.
2001),
available
at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC81.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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would increase the defendant’s recommended Guideline range in exchange for a guilty plea.166 Since child pornography crimes do not
present the same failure of proof and increased trauma to the child victim
issues as sexual assault cases, defendant-favorable plea bargains are not
as necessary.167 Therefore, even though the base Guideline range for
sexual assault cases is much higher than child pornography cases, child
pornography can often yield a much higher sentence because it presents a
much easier case to prove.168
Years of congressional and DOJ actions have shown an increased
effort to impose harsher penalties for child pornography.169 The Guideline range directly reflects these efforts.170 Harsher penalties serve the
overall goals of punishment, such as retribution and, most notably, deterrence.171 The government’s effort to impose harsher penalties on child
pornography defendants is a major stride towards elimination, or at least
minimization, of the market for child pornography altogether. Additionally, the Guideline range for child pornography is not unnecessarily
harsh as it is proportional to the Guideline range for other similar offenses such as sexual assault of a minor.
B. Propensity
Critics of child pornography sentences also argue that the Guidelines are unnecessarily harsh because no empirical data suggests that
viewers of child pornography are more likely to commit acts of physical
abuse.172 Furthermore, although there is no research to suggest that
viewing child pornography actually makes a person more likely to engage in sexual contact with a minor, some authors have attempted to argue that there is at least a casual relationship between increased web
access of pornography and decreased acts of sexual violence.173 However, even if this argument is true, it is unpersuasive and irrelevant. The
Guidelines do not serve to punish child pornography defendants simply
because they possess a heightened propensity to commit sexual acts with
a minor;174 rather, the act of viewing child pornography itself is a crime
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See generally discussion supra Part IV.A.
170. Id.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2009).
172. See Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes: Societal Revulsion
at Child Pornography Consumers Has Led to Stiff Prison Sentences and Caused Some Judges to
Rebel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at A14.
173. Steven E. Landsburg, How the Web Prevents Rape: All That Internet Porn Reduces Sex
Crimes, Really, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152487.
174. Klain et al., supra note 159, at 10.
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because it contributes to a lucrative industry that promotes the abuse of
children and child trafficking.175 Child pornography should not be
viewed as an inchoate offense, but as its own substantive completed offense.
Conservative estimates suggest that child pornography generates
$4.9 billion annually worldwide.176 Nearly one-fifth of the victims of
child pornography are between the ages of six and ten.177 The victimized
children experience severe physical and psychological harm as a result of
being utilized to produce these obscene images and videos.178 The child
is victimized during the act itself, then victimized again and again as the
image is spread online, immortalized by the Internet.179 Viewers of child
pornography exchange images and videos for money or for other images;
thus, the very act of viewing child pornography fuels a billion-dollar industry that is supported by sexual exploitation and victimization of children.180 The Guidelines for the crime reflect the Sentencing Commission’s view that imposing strict punishments will have a deterrent effect
on defendants and will serve to limit, and eventually eliminate, the market for child pornography.181
The Sentencing Commission’s logic is endorsed by numerous legislative and justice department initiatives, which are fueled in part by
widespread public concern and support.182 Because the Guidelines for
child pornography reflect sound policy and sentencing concerns, judicial
discretion should be limited to serve the deterrent effects envisioned by
the Sentencing Commission.
V. THE NEED FOR GREATER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF POST-BOOKER
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES IN ACCORD WITH § 3553
To provide greater stability and predictability in sentencing child
pornography defendants, judges should return to a closer and more deliberate consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Specifically,
courts should give great weight to the nature and circumstance of the
offense,183 the need to impose a sentence that reflects the aims of pu-

175. Id.
176.
Press
Release,
Internet
Filter
Review
2006,
http://internet-filterreview.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html; Klever, supra note 126.
177. Klain et al., supra note 159, at 6; Klever, supra note 126, at 108.
178. Klain et al., supra note 159.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1) (2009).
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nishment,184 and the need to avoid disparities in sentencing.185 Though
current Supreme Court jurisprudence renders the Guidelines merely advisory, great deference should be given to the Sentencing Commission’s
recommendations because they are the result of empirical research and
reflect sound congressional policy.186
This Part details how trial courts and reviewing courts should consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing sentences. Three factors in particular are regularly under-utilized by the sentencing courts that hear
child pornography cases. First, this Part begins by discussing the nature
of the offense. It then argues that because child pornography is a particularly graphic and lucrative industry that continuously victimizes children,
this crime is appropriately amongst the harshest punished offenses.
Second, it discusses how sentencing judges should consider the goals of
punishment when imposing sentences and argues that these specific
goals cannot be met by gross downward deviations from the Guideline
range. Finally, this Part discusses how the current state of federal sentencing for child pornography has a disparate impact on defendants convicted of similar crimes. It argues that increased judicial discretion in
child pornography sentencings will lead to the very harm the Court, in
Kimbrough, sought to avoid—unwarranted sentencing disparities on demographic lines. Because the child pornography Guidelines reflect
sound congressional intent and serve to punish a serious offense, the Supreme Court’s holding in Kimbrough should not be relied on by judges to
circumvent the Guidelines altogether.
A. Nature of the Offense
In considering the nature of the offense,187 courts should evaluate
the number of images and videos a defendant possesses, as well as the
age of the victims depicted and the gravity of the material.188 Child pornography cases yield notably high advisory Guideline ranges in part because of the multitude of sentencing enhancements available for this
crime.189 Defendants who take part in an online file-sharing program to
trade images with other users can incur significant sentencing enhancements based on the number of images or videos they accrue, the age of
the child victims, and the gravity of what is depicted in the images or
184. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
185. Id. § 3553 (a)(7).
186. See discussion supra Part II.
187. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1).
188. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008). The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual dictates an advisory Guideline range based on the offender’s characteristics and
criminal history and the nature of the offense. Id.
189. Id.
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videos.190 However, the fact that these severe sentencing enhancements
exist gives even greater weight to Congress’s intent to impose harsh penalties on child pornography defendants.191
The sentencing enhancements reflect congressional intent and acknowledgment that the nature and seriousness of the offense are important factors that will justify, if not require, a harsher sentence.192 As discussed, possession of child pornography should not be viewed as a victimless crime because the very act of trading or viewing images fuels an
industry that victimizes countless children each year.193 Many district
court judges have relied on the unpersuasive logic that possession of
child pornography is an innocent and victimless crime and, therefore, a
harsh sentence is not necessary.194 However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this approach and instead argued that creation, distribution, and
possession of child pornography creates a “permanent record of the
children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation.”195 In this way, child pornography does not fit into the same
category of victimless crimes as drug-related offenses because there is a
very real and identifiable victim.196 The fact that the victim is a child
who is continually victimized every time the image is exchanged online
for pecuniary gain197 exacerbates the serious level of the offense.
When imposing a sentence, district court judges should give great
deference to § 3553(a)(1) and consider the particularly serious nature of
this offense.198 The exploitation of child victims through a forum that
will continually solicit and distribute its images for monetary gain is a
heinous and sadistic offense that requires an equally harsh punishment.
Judges should provide detailed and explicit rationales before departing
from this reasoning.

190. Id
191. Id.
192. U.S. v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008).
193. Rogers, supra note 127.
194. See United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), in which the sentencing
judge referred to the crime of possession of child pornography as “truly a psychological crime. It is
not a taking crime . . . almost one might say a psychiatric crime.” See also United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d, 1187 (11th Cir. 2008) (characterizing possession as “passive and incidental”); United
States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the primary victim in child pornography offenses is society in general and not the specific child depicted).
195. United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
196. See Rogers, supra note 127.
197. Id.
198. 18 U.S.C. §3553 (2009).
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B. Goals of Punishment
Additionally, when imposing sentences, judges should strictly adhere to the primary goals of punishment: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.199 Particularly, deterrence should be given
great weight as strict sentences will help to eliminate the market for child
pornography altogether.
Child pornography is a multi-billion-dollar industry that relies on
child trafficking, rape, and exploitation to accrue a profit.200 The industry is sustained by people who choose to become consumers of this illegal business. Most child pornography sites function as file-sharing networks; that is, people do not actually pay for the images and videos but
they trade images and videos with other users.201 In this way, the image
itself becomes a means of pecuniary value that perpetuates the child pornography industry.202 People who do nothing more than download pornographic images from their home computers are actively contributing to
an industry that is fueled by child trafficking and exploitation.
There is a clear and evident need to deter child pornography consumers from aiding and promoting the industry. Imposing harsh sentences for child pornography related offenses has both an individual deterrent effect on the particular defendant and a general deterrent effect on
other child pornography consumers. As noted previously, child pornography cases have, at least lately, generated widespread media attention.
By imposing a strict punishment, sentencing judges send the message
that child pornography is a serious and offensive crime and those who
engage in it will be punished to the fullest extent proscribed by law.
Sentencing judges who wish to depart from this goal203 should do so only
in extreme and special circumstances and should fully explain their reason for deviation. A failure to adhere to the recommended Guideline
range in the average case would fail to satisfy the deterrent goals of punishment.
C. Need to Avoid Disparate Impacts in Sentencing
Finally, judges should give great weight to the need to avoid disparities in sentencing among defendants convicted of similar crimes.204 Par199. Id.
200. Klever, supra note 126; Stabenow, supra note 124; Schottenfeld, supra note 146.
201. Press Release, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Fact Sheet: The Financial
Coalition
Against
Child
Pornography
(Dec.
3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3
703.
202. Id.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2009).
204. See sentencing disparity discussion supra Part I.
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ticularly, sentencing should not be based on the sentencing judge randomly assigned to the case.205 Instead, judges should do their best to ensure that sentences are imposed somewhat systematically and predictably
so as not to have the disparate outcome that child pornography sentences
have today.206
As a result of Kimbrough, sentencing judges can categorically reject a Guideline range if they find that it yields an inappropriate result.
However, Kimbrough should be construed as a narrow holding that applied to the 100-to-1 crack cocaine disparity and should not be extended
to categorically reject the child pornography Guidelines. The concern in
Kimbrough was that the 100-to-1 sentencing ratio yielded disparate impacts on defendants, particularly on racial lines.207 Effectually, the ratio
imposed a much higher sentence on crack cocaine defendants, who were
largely minorities, than it imposed on powder cocaine defendants, who
were largely white.208 Additionally, it had the effect of imposing harsher
sentences on low-level dealers, who usually distribute crack cocaine,
than on high-level dealers, who usually distribute powder cocaine.209
The Court found that the 100-to-1 ratio was based on flawed empirical
and scientific evidence and therefore a judge’s categorical rejection of
the ratio was sound.210
The same reasoning does not extend to child pornography Guidelines. The Guidelines reflect a history of sound and specific legislative
intent to impose harsher penalties on defendants convicted of child pornography related offenses and to eliminate, or at least vastly reduce, the
market for child pornography.211 Furthermore, deviation from the Guideline range would potentially have the same negative effect that adherence
to the Guideline range in Kimbrough sought to avoid: sentencing disparity based on racial lines.212 The Kimbrough sentencing ratio had the
negative effect of imposing harsher penalties on minority defendants.213
However, downward departures from the Guidelines for child pornography have the adverse effect of giving lighter sentences to white defendants. As discussed above, child pornography defendants are completely

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, 86 (2007).
208. Id.
209. Jason Harrow, Commentary: Winners and Losers in Gall and Kimbrough, SCOTUS BLOG,
(Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-winners-and-losers-in-gall-andkimbrough.
210. Id.
211. See discussion supra Part IV.
212. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 111.
213. Id.
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atypical from the average federal defendant.214 Specifically, they are
overwhelmingly white, older, and more educated than the average defendant.215 Demographically, child pornography defendants mirror whitecollar defendants.216 Judicial leniency for these offenses could have the
exact adverse effect that Kimbrough was largely trying to avoid—
creating sentencing disparity along racial lines.
The goals of punishment require equal penalties for similarly situated defendants who commit similar crimes.217 As it stands, federal
sentencing for child pornography related offenses have little to no predictability. To comply with § 3553(a), judges should give greater deference
to the Sentencing Commission’s research and recommendations. PostBooker, judges should exercise their broad discretion with greater regard
for the Guidelines and not merely as an attempt to circumvent the Guidelines altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, recent years have shown a rapid and notable increase
in federal prosecutions for child pornography related offenses. In response to this enhanced concern, Congress and the DOJ have proscribed
numerous measures to further criminalize and better prosecute those who
victimize children. The USSC has reflected these efforts by proscribing
harsh but fair advisory Guidelines for child pornography related offenses.
However, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has afforded sentencing judges almost unbridled discretion. Though they must consider
the Guidelines when imposing a sentence, judges are allowed to impose a
sentence that completely deviates from the advised range so long as they
explain their reasoning. This increased discretion has led to vast disparity and unpredictability in sentencing that is completely contradictory to
the original conception of the SRA.
In order to avoid this unwarranted and undesirable disparity, judges
should give much greater consideration to the § 3553(a) factors when
imposing sentences. Particularly, they should consider child pornography as a multi-billion dollar industry fueled by child trafficking and exploitation. People who support this industry by distributing or possessing child pornography are directly fueling this business. Sentencing
judges should properly recognize child pornography offenses as serious
crimes requiring a harsh punishment.218 Second, judges should accom214. See discussion supra Part III.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2009).
218. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
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plish the goals of punishment, especially the need to send a strong deterrent message, by imposing harsh sentences that reflect the gravity of the
crime.219 Finally, judges should avoid disparate sentences.220 The
Guidelines assure that similarly situated defendants will receive similar
punishments. Therefore, any deviation from this range should be very
particular and well-reasoned and should not simply reflect a sentencing
judge’s disagreement with the Guideline range.

219. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
220. Id. § 3553(a)(7).

